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This short article sets out to investigate the extent to which the origins of Liberal support for 
European co-operation lay in an attachment to free trade and the belief in its propensity to 
bind nations together, reducing the likelihood of international conflict. This intimate 
association between free trade, peace, and Liberalism went back to the campaign against the 
Corn Laws in the 1830s and 1840s but remained central to the Liberal party’s identity 
throughout the nineteenth century. It proved perhaps surprisingly resilient in the face of the 
First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, and was only seriously challenged in the 
aftermath of a Second World War, in the face of the ‘Keynesian revolution’ and the relative 
decline of the British economy.     
Free trade and peace in nineteenth-century British Liberalism:  
The emergence of a distinctive Liberal identity in mid-nineteenth century Britain was 
virtually synonymous with the adoption of free trade and the range of cultural values 
associated with it. Whereas ‘liberal’ ideas of constitutional and religious freedom had long 
found advocates among Whig politicians, the transformation of economic thinking which 
followed from Smithian political economy became integral to the mindset of Liberal 
politicians and thinkers from the 1830s, and it is impossible to dissociate free trade from the 
Liberalism of Cobden, Mill, Gladstone, and Asquith.1 Within the colonial mind, Liberalism, 
particularly in Australia, did at times become distinctly protectionist in character,2 but before 
1914 Liberals in Britain who wished to embrace protection did so only after moving to the 
Unionist party; in the emergency conditions of both the First World War and the Depression-
hit 1930s, some Liberals departed temporarily from free trade loyalties but after the Second 
World War, most returned, not simply to a comforting hereditary faith but to a set of values 
linking peace, free trade, and interdependence which seemed newly pertinent in the post-war 
reconstructions of Europe and of the world economy. 
This close association between free trade and peace became central to Liberal debate and 
understanding following the controversy over, and repeal of, the Corn Laws in 1846. For 
Richard Cobden, the leader of the Anti-Corn Law League, free trade and peace became 
virtually synonymous, and he proclaimed free trade as ‘the only human means of effecting 
universal & permanent peace’. For this reason, he believed in 1842, ‘it would be well to try to 
engraft our Free trade agitation upon the peace movement – they are one and the same 
cause.’ This belief in turn was based on the idea of interdependence. ‘Free-trade by perfecting 
the intercourse & securing the dependence of countries one upon another must inevitably 
snatch the power from the governments to plunge their people into wars’.3 This linkage made 
explicit in political terms an argument which went back to the thinking of Enlightenment 
figures such as Montesquieu, who extolled the peaceful potential of trade (la douceur du 
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commerce).4 Late eighteenth-century statesmen influenced by Adam Smith and advocates of 
freer trade such as William Eden also included peace as among its benefits. The Anglo-
French commercial treaty of 1786 was thus lauded for the hope that ‘this new Connection 
between two great neighbouring nations may not only promote mutual Prosperity & Harmony 
but may tend to consolidate & preserve the general Peace of Mankind’.5 Such optimism 
before the French Revolution was however soon overlain by twenty-five years of warfare 
against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, when the only consortia of nations were the 
military alliances forged by Britain and the integration of Europe forged by Napoleonic 
military might. At the end of the French wars, peace-making led to the ‘Concert of Europe’ 
but this remained a conservative device for imposing a territorial settlement favouring 
Europe’s traditional rulers. In establishing the peace, military leaders such as Wellington 
deployed new tools of a quasi-collective European nature, but they remained geared to the 
immediate financial and military needs of peace-making rather than the longer-term 
reconstruction of Europe.6 But the wars also fuelled two radical engines of change. Firstly, 
among new groupings of the ‘Friends of Peace’, it encouraged popular support for the 
Enlightenment view that war was economically, socially, and politically harmful. Secondly, 
the war’s end had seen the formation of the Peace Society in 1816, opposed to all wars but 
also promoting the replacement of war by arbitration.7 The belief that free trade would 
undermine war also found a major exponent in the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, whose ideas 
were propagated by many leading free traders, including influential figures such as John 
Bowring.8 But it was the fusing of these three traditions in the thinking of Richard Cobden 
that brought the belief that free trade led to peace lastingly to the forefront of Liberal politics.   
For Cobden, the anti-Corn Law battle was therefore a ‘peace crusade’, and 
emphatically he upheld that it was free trade, rather than simply commercial ties, between 
nations that was paramount.9 Not only would free trade encourage peaceful relationships 
between states but low tariffs would reduce the amount of money available to governments 
for military expenditure and an aggressive foreign policy, inspired by the chimera of the 
balance of power and by the vested interests of Britain’s feudal-aristocratic establishment.10 
Cobden also believed that free trade would fatally undermine Britain’s colonial system, 
which ‘with all its dazzling appeal to the passions of the people can never be got rid of except 
by the indirect process of Free trade which will gradually & imperceptibly loose the bonds 
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which unite our colonies to us by a mistaken notion of self-interest’.11 Not all advocates of 
repeal shared Cobden’s visionary approach but it embodied the aspirations of the growing, 
especially Nonconformist, bourgeoisie and helped add an ethical international dimension to 
the economic ideas of the Anti-Corn Law League.12 It was also a vision which met 
enthusiastic support from within the peace movement, a view taken to extremes by quasi-
millenarian Liberal millowners such as David Whitehead of Rawtenstall.13 Arguably too this 
world view became distinctive of the emerging Liberal party, as it moved away from 
Palmerstonian interventionism towards a more internationalist foreign policy. Thus, 
Gladstone, while his starting-point was that of a Christian globalist, not only supported 
Cobden on issues such as opposition to war in China (1857) but fully embraced his mindset 
in terms of free trade, low tariffs, reduced arms expenditure, and the cause of peace.14 Under 
Gladstone, free trade became part of the mission of England, and he typically noted in 1876 
that ‘the operations of commerce are not confined to the material ends . . . there is no more 
powerful agent in the consolidation and knitting together the amity of nations’.15 Such 
assumptions were prevalent in the Victorian Liberal party. At the high thinking end of the 
party, J. S. Mill agreed that war was ‘always deleterious’ in its economic consequences and 
that ‘it is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete by strengthening and 
multiplying the personal interests which are in natural opposition to it’.16 But the view that 
free trade was a step to universal peace was widely shared among working-class activists, 
who participated in a wide number of associations linking trade and peace, for example, in 
1865 the Anglo-French Working-Men’s exhibition and the later Workmen’s Peace 
Association.17 
Free trade and Europe before the First World War 
The real dilemma for British Liberals in the mid-nineteenth century lay in selecting 
the best means by which free trade was to be advanced in the wider world – was it a 
spontaneous process, part of God’s handiwork, which required simply the removal of the 
‘artificial’ interference of the past or was it a more cooperative or collaborative process in 
which other nations should be urged to engage? In which case, what form of cooperation was 
much appropriate - was it simply a matter of setting out a British unilateral model of free 
trade, which Cobden, for example, widely propagated on his tour of Europe in 1846/47?18 
Here Cobden himself became increasingly wary of being perceived as an agent of ‘perfidious 
Albion’, pursuing free trade simply in Britain’s own interests, and insisted that nations 
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needed to domesticate the cause of free trade, and adopt lower tariffs unilaterally.19 This 
policy was not without success and recent research supports the idea of a considerable 
lowering of tariffs in the 1840s and 1850s.20 However, this process bypassed the larger states, 
including Germany (organised economically as the Zollverein), France, and Austria-Hungary. 
Nor did free trade advocates succeed in adding free trade to the peace negotiations after the 
Crimean war. How far therefore might the British government, as the world’s largest trading 
nation, need to intervene to draw other nations into trade bargaining? Eventually in the 
context of the Anglo-French war scare of 1859, Cobden was a convert to the need for 
commercial treaties, although insistent that concessions made by Britain would be offered to 
all countries, not on a simple bilateral basis. This led to a reappraisal of commercial treaties, 
which had fallen into disrepute in the 1830s and 1840s as simply bargaining tools, likely to 
favour vested interests, but now promoted as peace bonds between nations. The subsequent 
success of the Anglo-French (Cobden-Chevalier) treaty of 1860 in generating a whole rash of 
further treaties, creating the Cobden-Chevalier treaty network, encouraged some to foresee 
new forms of European co-operation, not simply as in the past over issues of war but for 
purposes of trade and taxation, a new public law within the ‘Commonwealth of Europe’. 
Nevertheless, what has been seen in retrospect as the first ‘common market’ generated less 
debate at the time than it perhaps deserved.21 However, free trade gained further support as an 
important part of the creation of new nations, for example, Italy or Greece, and in this way 
was associated with the deepening current of internationalism in the 1860s. Liberals also 
generally welcomed the wider means by which the integration of Europe was furthered – the 
improvements in travel and communications, including a proposed Channel tunnel (warmly 
commended by Cobden in the early 1860s), postal and telegraphic unions, as well as the 
growth of a European civil society as seen in friendship visits, transnational musical societies, 
trade bodies, and international congresses on a huge variety of issues ranging from free trade 
to statistics and public health.22 
Nevertheless, Liberal opinion remained divided on several issues involving the degree 
to which economic welfare required the creation of new institutional arrangements. Firstly, 
commercial treaties remained contentious. The repeal of the Corn Laws had been a radical 
departure from the past in its unilateral character, setting out a model of free trade which 
others might follow but which Britain undertook in her own interests, and without prior 
bargaining with other nations. This changed in 1860 with the return to the negotiating table, 
and although the concessions Britain made to France were generalised to all nations, this did 
not prevent considerable criticism of Britain’s departure from unilateralism from leading 
Liberals, including one of the architects of Repeal, C. P. Villiers, his brother Lord Clarendon,  
and Gladstone’s future chancellor Robert Lowe; by the 1870s, Gladstone himself would once 
more become doubtful about the ‘higgling’ involved in trade negotiations.23 A second 
division concerned the creation of a level economic playing-field within the European market 
– how far should free trade Britain benefit from the import of subsidised goods, from 
                                                 
19 For the case of Belgium, see Cobden to Corr van der Maeren, 5 Oct. 1856, The Letters of Richard Cobden vol. 
3 1854-1859 eds. Anthony Howe & Simon Morgan (Oxford, 2012), p. 243.  
20 Antonio Tena-Junguito, Markus Lampe, and Felipe Tȃmega Fernandes, ‘How Much Trade Liberalization was 
there before and after Cobden-Chevalier’, Journal of Economic History, 72/3 (2012), 708-40. 
21 Peter T. Marsh, Bargaining on Europe: Britain and the First Common Market, 1860-1992 (Yale, 1999). 
22 Francis S. L. Lyons, Internationalism in Europe, 1815-1914 (A. W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1963).  
23 Roger Swift, Charles Pelham Villiers: Aristocratic Victorian Radical (Routledge, London, 2017). p. 191.   
industries propped up by continental states? Should free trade also mean ensuring equality of 
conditions across nations? This led to a long-running debate on ‘cheap sugar’ (its selling 
price reduced by bounties on its production) with most Liberals ready to endorse the welfare 
benefits of maximum cheapness through free imports, although others were ready to promote 
the advantages of enlightened international regulation, removing subsidies and ensuring equal 
competition.24 A third issue concerned monetary stability and the monetary standard, with 
Liberals divided between those who saw the gold standard as the natural complement of free 
trade but also a minority who saw the monetisation of silver and a bimetallic standard as 
promoting greater equality of global economic conditions. The monetary unification of 
Europe was also extensively debated in the late 1860s, and although it generated more 
sceptics than converts, the latter included the economist Jevons and the Liberal Chancellor 
Robert Lowe, for whom unification would reduce the price of commercial transactions and so 
help maintain Britain’s competitiveness. This debate was largely at a technical level, but 
European monetary integration was not without its Liberal supporters in the 1860s.25  
Monetary unification in the 1860s was not foreseen as a prelude to political union but 
free trade and peace were throughout the nineteenth century occasionally linked with the 
ideal of a federal United States of Europe. This had been a part of continental discourse since 
Saint-Simon’s proposal for a European parliament in 1814. Its first popular flowering was 
during the continental revolutions of 1848, largely among French republicans and those 
inspired by Mazzini, with his goal of a brotherhood of nations.26 In an age with no British 
restrictions on the free movement of individuals, many such figures sought refuge in exile in 
England, where they found their ideological home and political defenders in Liberal circles.27 
Less enthusiasm greeted the possibility of a United States of Europe, but this suggestion was 
taken up by the working-class peace movement in the 1860s, with some support from 
sympathetic Liberal leaders, for example, Samuel Morley, who, in supporting a proposed 
international workmen’s exhibition in 1870, commended the ‘brotherhood of labour’ as a step 
towards a ‘United States of Europe’.28 In the wake of the Franco-Prussian war, academic 
liberals such as Seeley discussed the United States of Europe, if largely to dismiss it. 
Thereafter, this federal ideal became the property of the republican and socialist left across 
the continent, albeit still normally in association with free trade and disarmament. Other 
European liberals such as the French economist Leroy-Beaulieu occasionally promoted the 
idea of an ‘European economic alliance’.29 By the 1880s (and until the 1930s), the British 
Empire would prove a long-term deterrent to the Liberal commitment to a federal Europe, 
although by 1900 the Cambridge sage, Henry Sidgwick regarded federalism in Europe as 
‘most probable’ in the long term.30 In the short term, this ideal won over several British 
Liberal advocates, including the journalist Emily Crawford, the Cobdenite pamphleteer 
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Augustus Mongredien, and the prominent journalist and social reformer, W. T. Stead.31 The 
last was closely linked with the peace movement, and in this context, federalism was 
promoted as the best means towards peace, thereby undermining the priority of free trade 
itself. More typically, by the end of the nineteenth century, peace activists, while holding free 
trade to be a desirable and necessary goal, gave more immediate attention to legal and 
institutional means of achieving international disarmament and peace.32        
Despite some bifurcation therefore between the movements for peace and free trade 
which Cobden had sought to combine in the 1840s, most Liberals became increasingly aware 
of the urgent need to resist the growth of tariffs and the political appeal of economic 
protectionism in later nineteenth-century Europe. For the challenge of economic nationalism 
had grown rapidly in the wake of the completion of national unification in Germany and 
Italy.33 This challenge was fostered intellectually by the revival of protectionist ideas of 
Friedrich List, was encouraged materially by the falling incomes for farmers, peasants and 
manufacturers in the wake of the Great Depression(1873-96), and became financially 
attractive by the potential tariff income to fund the growing, mostly military, expenditure of 
the Great (and lesser) Powers in the age of empire.  Here, as the late Colin Matthew argued, 
Cobdenite international harmony promoted by trade was taken for granted and no collective 
nor British effort was made to counter protectionism;34 rather tariffs levels rose, markets 
became increasingly fragmented, and the division of the world into neo-mercantilist blocs 
loomed. British Liberals were reduced to attempts to warn or to influence, by galvanising 
fellow-spirits across the world – not always without effect.35 In such terrain, the links 
between free trade and peace were far from lost – tariffs were widely shown to be the source 
of arms expenditure, and the most avid free traders remained a core component of the peace 
movement.36 In the context of the Boer war, the peace movement, to some extent, was more 
successful in gaining attention, at least until the tariff wave threatened Britain itself. Here the 
‘tariff reform’ movement of Joseph Chamberlain provided the spark for the widespread 
restatement of Cobdenite ideas, in which the bonds between free trade, peace, and 
interdependence were reiterated by diverse categories of Liberal, not only F. W. Hirst but J. 
A. Hobson, L. T. Hobhouse and Bertrand Russell. The first International Free Trade Congress 
held in London in 1908 (accompanied by a Peace Congress) duly reiterated the core 
Cobdenite beliefs, now urged by powerful new recruits such as Winston Churchill.37 The fear 
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of protectionism, as retrograde both morally and economically, also prompted the entry into 
politics of many younger Liberals, including the novelist E. M. Forster. Free trade as a 
solvent of hostility between nations was an essential part of the growing critique of ‘old 
school, balance of power’ diplomacy, and in this way, the Liberal belief that free trade would 
act as a solvent of tensions between nations was powerfully restated in Edwardian Britain. 
The most lucid expression of this ‘neo-Cobdenite’ worldview was that of Norman Angell, 
arguing that the complex interdependence of the world made the economic costs of war so 
great, that future war would have no victors, and that any potential gains were ‘illusory’.38 
Free trade and peace in the age of total war 
Paradoxically, the First World War, whose outbreak falsified the long-held belief that 
economic progress made war impossible, included among its consequences a vigorous 
restatement of the old Liberal, even Cobdenite, belief that free trade was essential to future 
peace. Schemes for international government, which flourished as the war developed, sought 
inter alia to restore and guarantee free trade. This was the moral, for example, of Hobson’s 
biography of Richard Cobden: The International Man (1918) while Lowes Dickinson (whose 
father had painted a fine portrait of Cobden) regarded free trade between nations as an 
essential part of the antidote to ‘international anarchy’;39 the leading Edwardian social 
reformer Helen Bosanquet also turned her attention to foreign policy in Free Trade and 
Peace in the Nineteenth Century (1924), a work sympathetically reviewed by the economist 
and future Liberal candidate, Roy Harrod.40 Another Liberal, Lloyd George’s pre-war 
economic adviser, George Paish, author of The League of Nations Society’s tract The 
Economic Interdependence of Nations (1918), later toured Europe in the manner of Cobden 
in 1846/7 urging the necessity of free trade for the revival of European prosperity. Lest this 
restatement of the value of free trade be considered merely a revival (or even, survival) of an 
antiquated Cobdenite mindset, we need also to consider that post-war Liberal advocates of 
free trade included many of its advanced thinkers, not least Keynes himself in the immediate 
aftermath of the peace settlement. Here, while Keynes’ damning critique of the peace 
settlement is well-known, his positive proposals for economic reconstruction are too often 
ignored. Yet central to them was his scheme for a European free trade union, designed to 
overcome ‘the loss of organisation and economic efficiency, which must otherwise result 
from the innumerable new political frontiers now created between greedy, jealous, immature, 
and economically incomplete nationalist States.’41 As an antidote to the dangerous political 
fragmentation of Europe, the adoption of such a scheme, for Keynes, would typify the ‘whole 
of our moral and emotional reaction to the future of international relations and the Peace of 
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the World’.42  Later, for example, in 1921 he interpreted ‘the ancient doctrine of Liberalism’ 
to include ‘general disarmament’ as ‘the form of economy least injurious and most worth 
while’ and ‘by freedom of trade and international intercourse and co-operation, the limited 
resources of mankind could be employed to his best advantage’.43 In his thinking on 
reconstruction in Europe at the time of the Genoa Conference (1922), Keynes saw the real 
struggle in Europe not as one between Bolshevism and the bourgeoisie but as, in the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century, between ‘liberalism or radicalism, for which the primary 
object of government and of foreign policy is peace, freedom of trade and intercourse and 
economic wealth’ and ‘that other view, militarist or rather diplomatic which thinks in terms 
of power, prestige, national or personal glory, the imposition of a culture, and hereditary or 
racial prejudice’.44 In his ‘three dogmas of peace’, alongside the ‘general principle of 
pacifism’, and imperial disengagement, Keynes emphasised in equally Cobdenite terms, ‘we 
must hold to free trade, in its widest interpretation, as an inflexible dogma, to which no 
exception is admitted, wherever the decision rests with us. We should hold to free trade as a 
principle of international morals, and not merely as a doctrine of economic advantage’.45 As 
is well known Keynes’s faith in free trade wavered in the 1930s, while a sizeable number of 
Liberals rallied to the National Government and its protectionist policies after 1931. But, as 
Sloman has shown, the economic internationalism of the Party as a whole was strengthened, 
as economic nationalism was held accountable for Europe’s growing political tensions: ‘the 
ultimate justification for internationalist policies was the Cobdenite one that nations which 
traded with each other would not fight each other’.46 Hence, despite the flurry of Liberal 
interest in state intervention and planning in the late 1920s, after 1931 ‘free trade returned to 
the heart of Liberal policy’, with its emphasis on international co-operation restored.47        
The means towards such cooperation were, however, not always clear cut. Liberal 
opinion was divided between those who saw the League of Nations as designed primarily for 
the prevention of war by means of international conciliation and arbitration and those who 
saw part of the League’s work in recreating an international economy based on free trade.48 
For the most part, the League now became integral to attempts to restore the world economy, 
with the 1927 and 1933 World Economic Conferences and the cause of tariff disarmament 
widely supported.49 However, as the depression and the dictators struck and as faith in the 
League faded, those Liberals who remained globally rather than domestically oriented, 
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demonstrated growing interest in the idea of a federal Europe.50 Among liberal economists of 
the 1930s, including Robbins and Hayek, restraint of sovereignty in the form of common 
economic policies became part of the necessary price of free trade and avoidance of war; 
Robbins, for example, opposed Keynes’s arguments for national self-sufficiency by reference 
to the dangers of war between autarchic nation states.51 Similarly, if arrived at by a different 
route, leading federalists in the 1930s such as Lothian also emphasised the necessity of 
economic interdependence.52 As a result by 1946 a considerable body of Liberal opinion was 
ready to endorse the goal of a ‘Federal Europe’,  and, in a more gradual vein, to support 
moves towards the creation of a European common market.53 Yet agreement was never total 
– in the 1950s, the simulacrum of Victorian free trade, the Cobden Club remerged to energise 
bodies such as the Keep Britain Out movement and the Cheap Food League, although, by and 
large, this proved the prelude to their supporters’ departure from Liberal ranks and eventual 
absorption within the Thatcherite Conservative party.54  
 
By the 1950s, European integration, multilateral institutions, and nuclear arms seemed 
more likely to defend peace than the propagation of free trade. Even so, the belief that free 
trade, interdependence, and peace were inherently connected had been a virtually uncontested 
assumption within British liberalism for more than a century, not only as an economic creed 
but as an intrinsic part of an open society and of international morality. Such beliefs were 
essentially cosmopolitan in nature and global in implications, and in the twentieth century 
became a vital part of the Anglo-American relationship.55 But for the most part after 1846 
they had directed and guided Britain’s economic relationship with the Continent, seeking to 
reconcile individual welfare, growing national independence, and the European common 
good. Whether by means of unilateral decision-making, bilateral treaties, or multilateral 
institutions, the promotion of free trade was deemed a primary means towards ‘goodwill 
among nations’. Even so, however powerful such beliefs were, they served only to temper 
and rarely to overcome the forces of tariff protection, national rivalry, imperial expansion, 
and militarism in the ‘European century’.            
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